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In various books and articles I have characterized the Fundamental Question of Veterinary Medical Ethics as 
“to whom does the veterinarian owe primary allegiance, 
animal or owner?” There are two possible ideal answers 
to this question. On the one hand, the veterinarian may 
think of himself or herself as primarily obligated to the 
animal in the manner of a pediatrician and a child. In this 
model, though the parents pay the bills, the physician works 
towards maximizing the child’s health and welfare; so too 
the veterinarian is primarily obligated to the animal’s 
well-being. It is thus not surprising that the profession of 
pediatrics as a whole, has historically championed child 
health and welfare, opposing such pathogenic practices 
as child labor.
 
On the other hand, the veterinarian may see himself or 
herself as fundamentally obligated to the client in the 
manner of a garage mechanic. If a car owner says, “$1,000 
to fix it?  Trash it!”, the mechanic complies. Similarly, on 
this view, the veterinarian exists to implement the client’s 
wishes, (typically economic), regardless of what is in the 
interests of the animal. In the real world, most veterinarian 
work in various places along a spectrum between these 
two extremes, but that does not negate their value as a 
sound way of articulating ideals. 
 
In my 30 years of involvement with veterinary medicine, 
I have informally polled thousands of veterinarians 
regarding their ideal. The vast majority lean towards 
the pediatrician model and this is not surprising. In the 
Republic and elsewhere, Plato ingeniously pointed out that 
the role of any craftsman is to improve the material he or 
she works their art upon. Thus a goldsmith adds value to 
unworked gold; a carpenter increases the value of wood 
by making it into furniture; a sculptor turns stone into art. 
No such person should ever diminish the value of what 
he or she works on. If we think of medical professionals 
as exercising their art to improve the value of the object 
of their ministrations, plainly such people – physicians 
or veterinarians – exist to improve what they work on. 
Hence our horror at Nazi physicians or physicians who 
collude in torture – they are seen as violating the very 
nature of their profession. In the same way, veterinarians 
who set up “hits” on race horses for owners to collect 
insurance some years ago were viewed with horror and 
disdain by the public and even by “seen it all” cynical law 
enforcement personnel. In short, veterinarians may be 
seen conceptually as existing to improve the health and 
welfare of animals.
 
This view of veterinarians is easy to understand regarding 
companion animals. It is now virtually a cliché that people 
spend more on these animals than is justified by their 
market value. As early as 1981, the Wall Street Journal 
reported on people spending more than six figures on 
their animals at the pioneering CSU animal cancer center 
even if the economic value of the animal is $50. (Hence 
the existence of a correlative national thrust on the 
part of pet animal owners to increase compensation for 
veterinary malpractice.)
 
But what of animals whose value is primarily economic, 
such as laboratory animals or food animals? When I was 
involved in writing the U.S. federal laws for laboratory 
animals, the Congress was clear about placing laboratory 
animal veterinarians as guardians of the well-being of 
these animals, since these veterinarians were presumed 
to have one foot in the science camp, but also to be 
firmly situated as advocates for animal health and well-
being. (This mandated advocacy goes well beyond what is 
needed to assure good science.)
 
What of food animal practitioners? Under traditional, 
husbandry-based agriculture, the veterinarian’s job was 
to prevent disease, preserve good health, or, if necessary, 
treat a sick animal if it was cost-effective to do so, or to 
provide a good death if it was not. To succeed in traditional 
agriculture to, one must put square pegs in square holes, 
round pegs in round holes, and create as little friction as 
possible while doing so. Animal productivity was closely 
tied to animal health and welfare. A sick or stressed 
animal could not produce optimally. But all this changed 
when agriculture became industrialized in the mid-20th 
century. 
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For virtually all of human history, animal agriculture 
was based foursquare in animal husbandry.  Husbandry, 
derived from the old Norse word “hus/bond” or bonded 
to the household, meant taking great pains to put one’s 
animals into the best possible environment one could find 
to meet their physical and psychological natures (which, 
following Aristotle, I call telos) and then augmenting their 
ability to survive and thrive by providing them with food 
during famine, protection from predation, water during 
drought, medical attention, help in birthing, and so on. 
Thus, traditional agriculture was roughly a fair contract 
between humans and animals, with both sides being 
better off in virtue of the relationship. So powerful is the 
notion of husbandry, in fact, that when the Psalmist seeks 
a metaphor for God’s ideal relationship to humans, he 
seizes upon the shepherd in the 23rd Psalm:
 The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want. He  
 maketh me to lie down in green pastures; He  
 leadeth me beside the still waters; He restoreth  
 my soul.
We wish no more from God than what the husbandman 
provides for his sheep. In husbandry, a producer did 
well if and only if the animals did well, so productivity 
was tied to welfare. Thus, no social ethic was needed 
to ensure proper animal treatment; only the anticruelty 
ethic designed to deal with sadists and psychopaths was 
needed to augment husbandry. Self-interest virtually 
assured good treatment.
 
After World War II, this contract was broken by humans. 
Symbolically, at universities, Departments of Animal 
Husbandry became Departments of Animal Science, 
defined not as care, but as “the application of industrial 
methods to the production of animals” to increase 
efficiency and productivity. With technological “sanders” 
– hormones, vaccines, antibiotics, air handling systems, 
and mechanization – we could force square pegs into 
round holes and place animals into environments where 
they suffered in ways irrelevant to productivity. If a 19th 
century agriculturalist had tried to put 100,000 egg-laying 
hens in cages in a building, they all would have died of 
disease in a month; today, such systems dominate.
The new approach to animal agriculture was not the result 
of cruelty, bad character, or even insensitivity. It developed 
rather out of perfectly decent, prima facie plausible motives 
that were a product of dramatic significant historical and 
social upheavals that occurred after World War II. At 
that point in time, agricultural scientists and government 
officials became extremely concerned with supplying 
the public with cheap and plentiful food for a variety of 
reasons. In the first place, after the Dust Bowl and the 
Great Depression, many people in the United States had 
soured on farming. Second, reasonable predictions of 
urban and suburban encroachment on agricultural land 
were being made, with a resultant diminution of land 
for food production. Third, many farm people had been 
sent to both foreign and domestic urban centers during 
the war, thereby creating a reluctance to return to rural 
areas that lacked excitement; recall the song popular in 
the 1940s: “How ya gonna keep ‘em down on the farm 
after they’ve seen Paree?”  Fourth, having experienced 
the specter of starvation during the Great Depression, 
the American consumer was, for the first time in history, 
fearful of an insufficient food supply. Fifth, projection of 
major population increases further fueled concern. 
 
When the above considerations of loss of land and 
diminution of agricultural labor are coupled with the 
rapid development of a variety of technological modalities 
relevant to agriculture during and after World War II 
and with the burgeoning belief in technology-based 
economics of scale, it was probably inevitable that animal 
agriculture would become subject to industrialization. 
This was a major departure from traditional agriculture 
and a fundamental change in agricultural core values – 
industrial values of efficiency and productivity replaced 
and eclipsed the traditional values of “way of life” and 
husbandry.
 
The traditional prevalence of husbandry agriculture 
and the overwhelmingly predominant use of animals in 
such agriculture more or less assured proper treatment, 
as harming the animals or failing to put them into 
circumstances they were biologically suited for would 
harm their productivity and thus defeat owner self-
interest. The only societal ethic thus needed for animals 
in such a world was one forbidding deliberate, sadistic, 
willful, deviant infliction of pain and suffering on an animal 
– embedded in the anti-cruelty laws, since self-interest 
is a stronger sanction than law.  But when agriculture 
became industrialized, and society became aware of this 
change,  i.e. that farms were no longer Old McDonald’s 
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farm and new non-husbandry based uses of animals such 
as research toxicity testing and teaching had proliferated, 
it demanded legislated assurance that all animals are well-
cared for – hence the proliferation of animal-welfare-
related legislation--2,100 such bills proposed in the US 
at the state level in 2004. This new demand changed the 
social ethic to cover the industrialization of agriculture, 
which is not cruelty, but still a source of suffering. It is 
not an accident that the industry soft-pedals the change 
in agriculture. Perdue poultry ran ads on the urban East 
Coast for 15 years claiming that, “at Perdue we raise happy 
chickens” and showing chickens and cows and horses in 
a farmyard. In the same vein, ads for California cheese 
depict idyllic cows on pasture, when in fact, as one dairy 
practitioner told me; they never see a blade of grass.
Current social ethics clearly directs farm animal 
veterinarians towards the pediatrician model, by virtue of 
its expectations regarding animal welfare. To understand 
this point, one must examine the concept of “animal 
welfare,” a concept grossly misunderstood by the intensive 
agricultural industry and by veterinary medicine.
 
When one discusses farm animal welfare with industry 
groups or with the American Veterinary Medical 
Association, one finds the same response – animal welfare 
is solely a matter of “sound science”. Those of us serving 
on the Pew Commission, better known as the National 
Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, 
encountered this response regularly during our dealings 
with industry representatives.  This commission studied 
intensive animal agriculture in the U.S. (PCIFAP.org). 
For example, one representative of the Pork Producers, 
testifying before the Commission, answered that while 
people in her industry were quite “nervous” about the 
Commission, their anxiety would be allayed were we 
to base all of our conclusions and recommendations 
on “sound science”.  Hoping to rectify the error in that 
comment, as well as educate the numerous industry 
representatives present, I responded to her as follows: 
“Madame, if we on the Commission were asking the 
question of how to raise swine in confinement, science 
could certainly answer that question for us.  But that is not 
the question the Commission, or society, is asking.  What 
we are asking is, ought we to raise swine in confinement? 
And to this question, science is not relevant”.  Judging by 
her “huh”, I assume I did not make my point. 
Questions of animal welfare are at least partly “ought” 
questions, questions of ethical obligation.  The concept 
of animal welfare is an ethical concept to which, once 
understood, science brings relevant data.  When we ask 
about an animal’s welfare, when the animal is used by 
humans, we are asking about what we owe the animal, and 
to what extent.  A document called the CAST report, first 
published by U.S. Agricultural scientists in the early 1980’s, 
discussed animal welfare.  It affirmed that the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for attributing positive welfare to 
an animal were represented by the animals’ productivity. 
A productive animal enjoyed positive welfare; a non-
productive animal enjoyed poor welfare (CAST, 1981).
This notion was fraught with many difficulties.  First of all, 
productivity is an economic notion predicated of a whole 
operation; welfare is predicated of individual animals. 
An operation, such as caged laying hens may be quite 
profitable if the cages are severely over-crowded yet the 
individual hens do not enjoy good welfare.  Second, as 
we saw, equating productivity and welfare is, to some 
significant extent, legitimate under husbandry conditions, 
where the producer does well if and only if the animals 
do well, and animals are fitted into environments creating 
as little friction as possible.  Under industrial conditions, 
however, animals do not naturally fit in the niche or 
environment in which they are kept, and are subjected to 
“technological sanders” that allow for producers to force 
animals into unnatural environments – antibiotics, feed 
additives, hormones, air handling systems – so the animals 
do not die and produce more and more kilograms of 
meat or milk.  Without these technologies, the animals 
could not be productive. Before the development of 
these technologies, producing animals in such systems 
would have led to sickness and death.
The key point to recall here is that even if the CAST 
Report definition of animal welfare did not suffer from 
the difficulties we outlined, it is still an ethical concept.  It 
essentially says “what we owe animals and to what extent 
is simply what it takes to get them to create profit”.  This 
in turn would imply that the animals are well-off if they 
have only food, water, and shelter, something the industry 
has sometimes asserted.  Even in the early 80’s, however, 
there were animal advocates and others who would take 
a very different ethical stance on what we owe farm 
animals.  Indeed, the famous five freedoms articulated in 
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Britain by the Farm Animal Welfare view of what we owe 
animals, when it affirms that: 
“The welfare of an animal includes its physical and mental 
state and we consider that good animal welfare implies 
both fitness and a sense of well-being.  Any animal kept 
by man, must at least, be protected from unnecessary 
suffering.
We believe that an animal’s welfare, whether on farm, in 
transit, at market or at a place of slaughter should be 
considered in terms of ‘five freedoms’ 
1.  Freedom from Hunger and Thirst – by ready access to 
fresh water and a diet to maintain full health and vigor.
 
2.  Freedom from Discomfort – by providing an appropriate 




or rapid diagnosis and treatment.
 
4.		Freedom	to	Express	Normal	Behavior	– by providing 
sufficient space, proper facilities and company of the 
animal’s own kind.
 
5. Freedom from Fear and Distress – by ensuring 
conditions and treatment which avoid mental suffering.” 
(FAWC 1979)
Clearly, the two definitions contain very different 
notions of our moral obligation to animals (and there 
is an indefinite number of other definitions).  Which is 
correct, of course, cannot be decided by gathering facts 
or doing experiments – indeed which ethical framework 
one adopts will in fact determine the shape of science 
studying animal welfare. 
To clarify: suppose you hold the view that an animal is 
well-off when it is productive, as per the CAST Report. 
The role of your welfare science in this case will be to 
study what feed, bedding, temperature, etc. are most 
efficient at producing the most meat, milk, or eggs for the 
least money – much what animal and veterinary science 
does today.  On the other hand, if you take the FAWC 
view of welfare, your efficiency will be constrained by the 
need to acknowledge the animal’s natural behavior and 
mental state, and to assure that there is minimal pain, fear, 
distress and discomfort – not factors in the CAST view of 
welfare unless they have a negative impact on economic 
productivity.  Thus, in a real sense, sound science does not 
determine your concept of welfare; rather, your concept 
of welfare determines what counts as sound science!
The failure to recognize the inescapable ethical component 
in the concept of animal welfare leads inexorably to those 
holding different ethical views talking past each other. 
Thus, producers ignore questions of animal pain, fear, 
distress, confinement, truncated mobility, bad air quality, 
social isolation, and impoverished environment unless any 
of these factors impact negatively on the “bottom line”. 
Animal advocates, on the other hand, give such factors 
primacy, and are totally unimpressed with how efficient 
or productive the system may be
A major question obviously arises here.  If the notion of 
animal welfare is inseparable from ethical components, 
and people’s ethical stance on obligations to farm animals 
differ markedly across a highly diverse spectrum, whose 
ethic is to predominate and define, in law or regulation, 
what counts as “animal welfare”?  This is of great concern 
to the agriculture industry, worrying as they do about 
“vegetarian activists hell-bent on abolishing meat”.  In 
actual fact, of course, such concern is misplaced, for the 
chance of such an extremely radical thing happening is 
vanishingly small.  By and large, however, the ethic adopted 
in society reflects a societal consensus, what most people 
either believe to be right and wrong or are willing to 
accept upon reflection.
Since 1978, I have devoted much of my career to 
anticipating the emerging social ethic and explaining 
it to veterinary medicine, industry, and the public. The 
first point is that this ethic goes well beyond the ethic 
of anti-cruelty – less than 1% of animal suffering results 
from deliberate sadistic cruelty of the sort caused by the 
cruelty laws. Whatever the source of animal suffering, be 
it sadism or the quest for scientific knowledge or cheap 
food, people wish to see it minimized. Secondly, they wish 
to see the animal’s biological and psychological needs 
and natures (what I call telos,) respected in use. Whereas 
40 years ago I visited a zoo where the giraffe’s indoor 
enclosure was such that the animal could not stand up, 
today such a facility would not last a week. The public 
rejection of violating animal nature is manifest in laws such 
as California’s proposition 2, rejecting battery cages for 
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laying hens, gestation crates for sows, and confined veal 
in crates, or Arizona’s, Oregon’s, Florida’s, and Colorado’s 
focus on sow stalls. Industry experts affirm that such 
laws would pass in every state, and I convinced Smithfield 
farms, the world’s largest pork producers, to phase out 
sow stalls by calling their attention to emerging social 
ethics for animals, which they verified by surveys and focus 
groups. The Pew Commission report calls for elimination 
of high confinement animal agriculture within a decade. 
And the laboratory animal laws of 1985 I worked on for 
10 years prior to their passage demand control of pain 
and distress in research and teaching, and enrichment of 
environment for laboratory animals.
In short, this new ethic demands that animals not 
suffer uncontrolled pain or distress, that their teloi be 
respected, and that the fairness inherent in the “ancient 
contract” of husbandry be restored. This ethic provides 
the ethical content to the concept of animal welfare, and 
demands that it be guaranteed through the legal system. 
A Gallup poll conducted in 2003 indicated that 75% of 
the U.S. general public wished to see legislated assurance 
of farm animal welfare.  Insofar as societal demands apply 
to veterinarians, it is clear that the societal ethic reaches 
the same conclusion we derived from Plato – that 
veterinarians work to improve the health and welfare of 
animals of all sorts.  
If veterinarians fail to perform this function for animals, 
they lose their societal respect and indeed violate the 
internal logic of being a veterinarian as opposed to a 
mechanic.  It is likely for this reason that what I have 
called “scientific ideology” or the “common sense of 
science” which derived the knowability of mental or 
conscious states in animals was so widespread and so 
different to dislodge. It is a violation of common decency 
to cause pain, distress, fear, anxiety, discomfort, social 
isolation to beings who are aware – this is manifestly true 
for ordinary people. How much the truer would it be 
for those whose life’s work involves caring for animals? 
It was presumably comforting to scientists as it was to 
Descartes to believe that what ordinary common sense 
would call creating pain or other negative feelings in 
animals was not really what it appeared to be, but simply 
“nociception” or some other mechanical response. How 
much the more so would it be to those whose focus 
is making animals better? Hence there was virtually no 
acknowledgement of felt pain in science or veterinary 
medicine. The first U.S. textbooks of anesthesia (Lumb, 
1963; Lumb and Jones, 1973) do not mention felt pain or 
that pain hurts or discuss analgesia
When introducing to Congress what became the 1985 
U.S. laboratory animal laws mandating pain control, I was 
asked by Congress to show that this was not being done 
without the law. I responded by doing a literature search 
for “laboratory animal analgesia” and finding no papers, 
and when broadening the search to “animal analgesia” 
found only two, one of which said there ought to be 
papers. (Under pressure of federal law, the number of 
papers has proliferated, as has use of analgesia.)  
 
It is perhaps something like this ideological defense 
mechanism that has allowed veterinary medicine to 
avoid the conclusion of one of my food animal colleagues 
that production diseases are “the shame of veterinary 
medicine.” For while there is a huge literature on causes, 
treatment, control, treatment, and nature of production 
diseases, there is nothing on the ethics thereof.  Yet, 
manifestly, tolerating the very existence of production 
diseases is a major ethical issue for veterinary medicine. 
 
What are production diseases? They are pathological 
conditions in an animal resulting exclusively or 
overwhelmingly from the way the animal is bred for, used, 
or kept in a production system. While the term originally 
referred to metabolic diseases such as hypocalcemia in 
dairy cattle, it is more reasonably deployed to cover 
a variety of diseases – metabolic infections, genetic, 
environmental and even behavioral. Production diseases 
are largely a result of the intensification of agriculture. 
As one book puts it, “Common production diseases 
that affect dairy cattle such as ketosis, fatty liver, and 
displaced abomasums, rarely, if ever, affect beef cows on 
pasture.” (Drackley, 2006). As one early discussion put it: 
“Production disease is a man-made problem; it consists 
of a breakdown of the various metabolic systems of the 
body under the combined  strain of high production 
and modern intensive husbandry.” (Payne, 1972) Shortly 
thereafter, infectious and other diseases supplemented 
metabolic diseases in the understanding of production 
diseases.
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cattle. This disease leads to condemnation  of 5 to 10% 
of carcass livers at slaughter. It also affects the animals’ 
general health. (Nagaraja and Chengappa, 1998) (The 
percentage would be much higher without tylosin).  The 
obvious answer is to modify the diet.  But, producers 
make more money with the grain diet even with the lost 
carcasses than they would if they fed more grass.   This is a 
classic example of productivity failing to assure welfare!
And the subject of this conference represents yet 
another example, as we just mentioned, since a major 
factor in the advent of this disease is humanly-caused 
stress.  Other relevant manageable factors are crowding 
(which facilitates transmission) and other stressful living 
conditions combined with universal cow genetic selection 
for production.  A list of other production disease in 
cattle is a dismal indictment of modern production 
– ketosis, metritis, hypocalcaemia, laminitis, dystocia, 
mastitis, foot and leg problems, reproductive problems, 
displaced abomasums, fatty liver, retained placenta, 
reproductive failure, and digital dermatitis.  An univocal 
selection for production has created osteoporosis and 
cloacal prolapse in egg-laying hens, skeletal disorders in 
chickens and turkeys, flip-over syndrome in broilers and, 
historically, porcine stress syndrome in swine.  (Though 
the genetic component has been eliminated, the disease 
is still prevalent due to environmental factors.) 
 
What are we to say of production diseases from an 
ethical point of view?   No one could possibly question 
that, regardless of one’s definition of welfare, good health 
is surely presuppositional to good welfare, and that 
production diseases are thus inimical to good welfare. 
And if the essence of veterinary medicine is to act like 
a physician for animals, it clearly cannot accept treating 
production diseases which are preventable by changing 
the system of production.   Often in the swine industry, 
and regularly in the poultry and egg industries, individual 
sick animals may not even be treated—“herd health” has 
superseded treating individuals. It is conceptually and 
morally impossible for veterinarians to accept systems 
that make animals sick, rather than trying to change the 
system.  And we know that this can be done because 
these diseases were of far less or no importance prior 
to the advent of industrial agriculture.  (To be fair, there 
were other diseases prevalent, such as parasites in swine 
raised outdoors.  But such diseases were nowhere near 
as serious or prevalent as current production diseases. 
There is an indefinite number of such diseases. Many are 
caused at least in part by univocal breeding exclusively for 
production, such as lameness and reproductive problems 
in dairy cattle, mastitis in dairy cattle, and skeleto-muscular 
problems in broiler chickens. Others are caused in part 
by crowding, such as tail-biting. Others came from failure 
of the environment in which they are kept to respect the 
animals’ biological nature, such as foot and leg problems 
in cattle and swine, where animals evolved for pasture are 
kept on concrete. Others such as cannibalism and feather 
pecking in laying chickens and tail-biting in swine are also 
caused by extreme confinement not allowing for escape 
and establishment of normal dominance hierarchies. Still 
others result from unnatural feeding practices, such as 
liver and rumenal abscesses in feed-lot cattle. And while 
BRD or shipping fever is multi-factorial, a major part of 
its etiology is the stress of confinement and transport 
and mixing of cattle. Pastoral beef cattle slaughtered near 
home would not show current rates of shipping fever. 
Much of shipping fever could be prevented by changing 
genetics, but this would result in lower productivity so it 
is not done. It is fair, then, to attribute many production 
diseases to the industrialization of agriculture, and the 
concomitant emphasis on production over all else, and the 
tendency to put the animals into unnatural environments 
or unnatural feeding regimes (cf. Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy or BSE.)
 
Let us look more closely at a few representative 
production diseases.
The most striking example I can think of occurs in the 
use of geese for production of pate de foi  gras. (This 
disease predates the industrialization of agriculture.) The 
geese are force-fed to deliberately produce the disease 
known as fatty liver for the sake of creating a soft pate. 
It is indicative of the neglect of such diseases from an 
ethical point of view that AVMA has failed to speak 
against the system.  Even more indicative is the fact that 
the 350 small print pages comprising the 110 papers in 
the standard text, Production Diseases in Farm Animals, 
not one chapter, paragraph or even sentence is devoted 
to ethics. (Joshi and Herdt, 2006)
As mentioned earlier, another exazmple is provided by 
rumenal and liver abscesses in fed cattle.  Such abscesses 
are a direct result of feeding too “hot” a grain diet, with 
insufficient roughage.  They occur in 12 to 32% of fed 
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Furthermore, protection from parasites does not justify 
wholesale violation of a pig’s telos.)  I am not saying that 
veterinarians should fail to treat sick animals that are 
created by current production systems; in fact they need 
to add more treating of individual animals to the current 
emphasis on herd health.  Most swine veterinarians do 
not treat individual animals on large swine operations – 
this work is assigned to stockpeople who may not be 
adequately trained in diagnosis and treatment.. The same 
is true in broilers and layers. But I am saying veterinary 
medicine should not accept the status quo and band-aid 
pathogenic systems. As my friend Tim Blackwell, chief 
swine veterinarian for the province of Ontario puts it, 
“We are obligated to treat (band-aid) the diseases, but 
we are not obligated to defend the systems that created 
these diseases.”
 
What should be done is for veterinarians, with the 
support of the new social ethic, to pioneer in the redesign 
of livestock production systems.  Presuppositional to 
such new systems must be the health and welfare of the 
animals.  When that is assured as a foundation, one can go 
on to try to maximize profit.  (Note that a total emphasis 
on production does not necessarily entail profitability, 
as for example has been shown in the dairy and swine 
industries.) 
 
Veterinarians alone, of course, cannot change these 
pathogenic systems. But they can work to convince 
producers that society will not tolerate these systems 
much longer, and can lead in finding economically viable 
modifications and alternatives. And organized veterinary 
medicine must stop being the cheer-leaders for current 
systems—witness AVMA saying that there are no better 
and worse sow housing systems at the same time as 
Smithfield eliminated gestation crates.
 
It is possible that such reform may result in higher food 
prices.  This is not necessarily the case – group housing 
of swine costs 50% for capitalization of what gestation 
crates cost.  But it is certainly likely as one attempts to 
restore good husbandry.  So what?  Americans spend only 
some 10% of their income for food – Europeans spend 
double that.  Recent activity on behalf of animal welfare 
such as Proposition 2 in California indicates the fact that 
public concern is not mitigated by threats of increased 
prices – the egg industry lost soundly despite that ploy. 
As the Federation of European Veterinarian affirmed 
over 20 years ago, higher food prices are a small price to 
pay to assure that the animals we consume have decent 
lives.  The public was not deterred from demanding law 
protecting the interests of laboratory animals by dire 
threats from the research community that such laws (i.e. 
the laws of 1985 that I helped draft and defend) would 
prevent discoveries that cure sick children.  (In fact the 
opposite is the case.)
 
When one couples the existence of production 
disease with the other costs of industrial agriculture – 
environmental despoliation, loss of sustainability, animal 
and human disease, antibiotic resistance of pathogens, 
the loss of small farms and farm communities, damage 
to human and animal health, cheap food does not seem 
so cheap; many of the costs are in fact externalized to 
consumers.  It is not a wonder that the PEW commission 
on which I served for almost three years recommended 
the abolition of high confinement industrial agriculture 
within 10 years, and was greeted by much support from 
the press.  People realize that these problems must be 
solved for the sake of a “livable future.” One of Pew’s 
conclusions is that so-called “cheap food” is only 
cheap at the register, while hidden costs are regularly 
“externalized,” i.e. charged to the public in hidden ways.
Furthermore, I have sufficient faith in American ingenuity 
to believe that agriculture can be recrafted to solve the 
above problems and still provide food at a reasonable 
price.  We have never in fact tried – the last 50 years have 
witnessed excessive emphasis on productivity. It is very 
likely that agriculture can and will rise to the challenge 
of reinvesting itself taking cognizance of the other values 
hitherto neglected.  It is fitting that veterinarians, who 
should be guardians of animal health and welfare, lead 
this change.  If the industry fails to adjust, it risks loss 
of autonomy and freedom as the public acts to rectify 
what it finds abhorrent, but does not fully understand.  As 
the history of animal husbandry demonstrates, we raised 
animals for 1000 years viewing disease as the enemy, not 
as an ally in the quest for profit.  
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